Shifting Narratives: The United States in a Post-Counterterrorism World

Posted on by Son of the Sultanate

The Soviet Union Began by Banishing God. The United States began as a community of people who wanted to worship God as they chose. Many factors contributed to the outcome of the Cold War…Communism was defeated by an alliance spearheaded by “one nation under god”

Richard Nixon

The United States, as a nation, has endured civil war and revolution in its struggle for independence and democratic governance. Since the early settlements began in the 17th century, the flow of goods, peoples and ideas have helped America expand and industrialize, emerging as the United Colonies and subsequently, culminating into the free United States of America we know today. Defeating the British Empire in the 18th century, the world’s superpower at the time, must have instilled in the early Americans that God was on their side. The settlers’ strong belief in manifest destiny – which some settlers believed the lands of America were ordained unto them by God – drove them to expand onwards to conquer all of the United States’ current territory over time (Pratt, 1927).

As the Old World empires became embroiled in conflict and turmoil leading to two destructive world wars, it left the young American nation to fill the empire vacuum and dominate the world order. Blessed with abundant natural resources and straddling two great oceans on either side, the United States was probably on its way to global primacy anyway (Lenz, 2008). 

American power emanated not only from its geopolitical sources of power, but through a long-lasting belief in the principles set out in its constitution, and by its values and democratic ideals. The United States views itself and its identity in relation to the rest of the world, and carried forth the idea of manifest destiny into its foreign policy (Brands, 1998; Zoysa, 2005; Pfaff, 2010). The United States, emboldened by the fall of the Soviet Union and shocked by the 9/11 attacks, believed it was necessary to ensure the dominance of its supposed superior values, legal system and ideals over the rest of the world, leading to, as Pfaff observes, to “an American mission to abolish evil from the world (a task in the past ordinarily thought reserved to God)” (2010, p15).

It seems, therefore, that America’s history and its self-prophesied destiny are intertwined with one another and both lead it to differentiating itself from the rest of the world. Its purported special mission to civilize the world (Kaplan, 1995) spills forth into its foreign policy by extension under the banners and slogans that are perceived to differentiate them from their adversaries by ways of morality, inherent values or perceived goodness. American political myths such as manifest destiny and god-ordained civilizing mission in the world, that are deeply embedded in the American psyche, have led to the belief in American exceptionalism (Krebs, 2015a).

This paper therefore analyses the United States’ foreign policy by exploring the United States’ use of grand narratives. This paper defines such narratives as political banners or slogans that are designed by the state to headline its foreign policy priorities. These narratives stem deeply from a state’s political culture, myths, identity and history, and thus can be built to be espoused by both sides in a narrative battle. To illustrate, by brandishing Iran as an ‘’Axis of Evil’ state by the United States, Iran has also used similar rhetoric in calling the United States ‘the Great Satan’ to the Iranian populace (Pyszczynski et al, 2006). Narratives also differ in nature and in aims (Schmitt, 2018). For instance, post-Brexit “Global Britain” serves to outline Britain’s re-orientation to engage regions and states around the world, with less of a material focus on Europe (Peters, 2021). Similarly, China’s “peaceful rise” formally denotes the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) purported goal of peacefully attaining its former prestigious status in the world, by channeling efforts towards diplomacy, trade and investment globally. 

On the other hand, the United States has utilized several grand narratives during different eras, yet they have proven consistent with its worldview, as this paper will show. The U.S. provides for compelling study as its narratives have predominantly been carved out from its historical identity as a people ordained by God locally and globally that shapes its foreign policy. Hence, American grand narratives will form the main analysis of this paper. 

The United States’ narratives are confrontational in nature, as they aim to elicit a “rally around the flag” effect on its general population and on policymakers, by giving them an adversary to, essentially, rally against. In the United States’ case, grand narratives provide strategic priority for the execution of foreign policy against an identified adversary that is perceived to threaten the US’ existence and/or values. Furthermore, they enable and justify the ends through the use of all means at the U.S.’ disposal, mainly achieved by demonizing said adversary. The U.S. relies upon its distinct history ordained through a sustained belief in manifest destiny in its viewing of the world and its role in it. Hence, political myths are instrumental in shaping grand narratives (Bottici, 2007; Schmitt, 2018).

Such grand narratives are as old the United States itself and can be found to be used during the American settlers’ national expansion in the 18th century, World War 2 against Nazi Germany, the Cold War against the Soviet Union, the War on Terror against Islamic extremists, and now, in the new Cold War against China. While this paper does not suggest that designating a national grand narrative means a single-minded U.S. focus on an identified adversary, narratives aid in the contextualization of the main drivers of foreign policy.

In broader terms, such narratives with a rallying effect stem from, and contribute to, propaganda generation. Propaganda, by no means, is limited to shaping foreign policy and forming new political ideals of a state, it encompasses all areas of governance and life. Jacques Ellul points this out but also adds that propaganda heavily influences government policy and can cement popular notions and perceptions as well (1962). Narratives identified here as political banners do not prescribe specific policy actions, rather they outline general foreign policy priorities. 

While narratives may guide foreign policy, they further serve as tools for propaganda generation, especially when certain policy choices do not complement the overall narrative. For example, China’s peaceful rise narrative is not easy to sell in light of it building islands within disputed waters in the Asia Pacific, or its repression of Uyghur Muslim minorities in its western borderlands. Similarly, the United States’ self-ordained civilizing and democratizing mission is severely undermined when it orchestrates CIA-backed coups of democratically elected governments as seen during the Cold War, or when it tortures prisoners in prisons such as Abu Ghraib in the name of the War on Terror. Thus, policy choices do not necessarily complement the grand narrative set out.

This paper purposefully avoided substituting narratives for metaphors – unlike Heradstveit & Bonham (2007) – as the latter are mainly used as literary devices in speech. Narratives, on the other hand, tell a story about history, identity and values, while providing continuous cover for a continuous enactment of foreign policy (Browning, 2008; Krebs, 2015a). However, metaphors can have a similar utility to narratives in how the narrating state views, and how it expects its populace to view, the world (Heradstveit & Bonham, 2007). Further to this, it has been noted that the use of narratives to understand international relations and foreign policy has grown, at least notably, since the 1990s (Kirke, 2015; Schmitt, 2018; Hagstrom & Gustafsson, 2019).

Narratives, similar to metaphors as explained by Heradstveit & Bonham, help to reimagine the world at large (2007). The narrating state uses these narratives to reshape their own and their people’s understanding of the world to identify real or constructed threats to their values or existence. Heradstveit & Bonham explain this when concluding that Iran’s inclusion into America’s ‘Axis of Evil’ narrative being due to the “theocracy’s general hostility to the United States (opposition to good must be evil)” (2007, p424). Hence, the perceived goodness of the United States necessitates its combat with its adversaries, and by extension, expects the American people to view this course of action as just & necessary. However, the latter aim has not always produced the intended results of engendering a rallying effect, as observed by Krebs (2015b).

In alluding to the ‘faces-of-power’ framework, which defines four separate ‘faces’ to the use of narratives (Shepherd, 2015), the fourth face of power is predominant in this paper’s understanding of US narratives vis-a-vis its foreign policy, as this fourth face limits narratives to a predefined cultural and historic context. Hagstrom & Gustafsson further highlight that this fourth face necessitates a master narrative that is ‘deeply institutionalized’ (2019, p392). However, this paper adds that, in the case of U.S. foreign policy at least, such grand narratives of the fourth face have been observed to lean toward creating a rallying effect in their perspective, tonality and intent. The U.S. relies on deeply-rooted foundational political myths such as manifest destiny, among others, to build such grand or master narratives – as this paper will show.

Thus, it can be concluded that grand narratives are products of internal propaganda, as they work to cement certain notions developed by foundational political myths, that are themselves composed of states’ historical experiences and values. They do not always produce consistency in policy choices. However, they remain important tools for conducting U.S. foreign policy as they work to create a rallying effect at home to aid states identify and differentiate themselves from adversaries. Similarly, narratives demarcate and redefine the world as the narrating states imagine it to be in a given context. In the case of the United States, these narratives emanate from a fourth-face understanding of the intents and purposes of narrative-making that are deeply embedded in American identity and  ultimately guide and shape foreign policy priorities.

This paper examines the United States’ long history of narrative building to counter adversaries throughout the Cold War & War on Terror eras to better understand the current narrative models deployed against the perceived threat of China’s rise as a global power. Hence it aims to deconstruct the United States’ deeply-rooted self-perception and national identity to gain a more refined understanding of the narratives used by the United States during the aforementioned wars. This understanding will aid in an evaluation of the use of narratives in the post-counterterrorism era that are focused largely on the threat of China’s rise. This paper will show a divergence from traditional, inward narrative building models that were based on distinguishing a ‘good’ United States from ‘evil’ adversaries – as seen during the Cold War and War on Terror – where it espoused its manifest destiny and mission to protect its ideals against perceived foreign evils. The contemporary narratives levelled against China – henceforth referred to as the ‘Chinese narratives’ – are manifested through purely secular terms and target a global audience. The United States defines China’s threats in these narratives by magnifying the latter’s challenge to the Rules Based Order (RBO) in the international system and continues to level claims against China being a revisionist power that undermines western ideas about the status-quo.

American Inward Narratives: Historical Context

The United States perceives itself in relation and in contrast to the rest of the world, as noted by some scholars (Huntington 1997; Pillar, 2016). As shown earlier, the U.S. uses the narrative of manifest destiny to elevate their values and principles above those of the rest of the world. They use this in multiple manifestations that have included equating their role to a battle for good over evil. This renders grand narratives as strategic necessities in combating US adversaries, by firstly identifying said adversaries, defining the threats they pose to America and its values, and by magnifying what differentiates them from the United States in terms of values and global ideals. Simply put, the United States has a tendency to search for “monsters to destroy” (Pillar, 2016, p109). It is thus imperative to view Washington’s foreign policy by considering the norms and values that they perceive to be under threat – as will be examined further in this text.

At home, the United States views itself as the protector of the ‘Free World’ and holds certain human rights as inalienable, and thus pursues a foreign policy to reinforce these popular ideals abroad, evident during the Cold War and the War on Terror periods (Mertus, 2004). Its toolkit in pursuing these ideals globally includes – as will be seen in the coming paragraphs – preemption as an overarching tactic and guides foreign-policy thinking in the United States, particularly since the second Bush’s presidency (Strategic Comments, 2002). Moreover, the United States has deployed diplomacy, force & subversion dedicated to the ideals set out by their grand national narratives across various eras (Palmer,2005). In essence, the U.S. uses all tools available at its disposal to gear itself toward foreign policy objectives that are based on the grand narrative at hand in a significant way. 

The Cold War saw the United States focus its efforts on combating the Communist Soviet Union and its allies while defending other ‘free’ or allied states and entities from this perceived threat. Among many other instances, the United States was involved militarily in the Vietnam War, it provided support to Cuban rebels in the Bay of Pigs Invasion attempt in 1961 and directly sponsored and orchestrated coups in several states including Iran and Guatemala (Westad, 2005). These initiatives were all based on the Cold War grand narrative that dominated US foreign policy; referred to as the ‘Cold War Consensus’ (Wittkopf & McCormick,1990; Krebs, 2015a). 

The culmination of such a narrative stemmed largely from the irreconcilable ideological differences between the democratic & liberal values of the United States and the Communist ideals & totalitarian nature of the Soviet Union (Nixon, 1994). This consensus called for and enabled a containment strategy against the Soviet Union to limit its expansion and spread to ‘free’ nations of the world (Wittkopf & McCormick, 1990), as demonstrated by the aforementioned military interventions, support of rebel forces against Communism and the orchestration of coups in foreign states around the world during the Cold War.

The Cold War Consensus narrative was – for better or for worse – helpful in gearing U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War, however it has been shown that it did not lead to as comprehensive a rallying effect as intended. This consensus, due to its strong propagandistic nature, was a narrative “to which American elites…felt compelled to adhere in their public announcements, regardless of their private qualms (Krebs, 2015b, p191). Despite Krebs’ aforementioned assertion, Gelb & Betts observed that the consensus narrative was a direct cause of the decision to go to war in Vietnam during the Cold War (1979). The aforementioned views highlight that the consensus narrative played a vital role in the unfolding of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. 

There remains a considerable amount of scrutiny surrounding the extent to which an internal consensus was ever reached amongst policymakers after espousing this Cold War narrative (Wittkopf & McCormick, 1990; Krebs, 2015a; Krebs, 2015b), however, this paper’s focus is on the fact there was a Cold War narrative at all, and not whether its aims of producing a rallying effect (or in this instance, a consensus) were achieved or not. The overarching finding here is that an inward-geared narrative was used and that it guided U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. This consensus narrative identified the Soviet Union & Communism as America’s adversaries and utilised the threats the former were perceived to have posed to American values as cause and justification for creating the consensus narrative. The Cold War Consensus is linked directly to US foreign policy of both covert and overt military action and in its financial and logistical support to allies, non-aligned states and anti-Communist entities. It remained in-line with America’s self-identification as a nation ordained by God through its belief in manifest destiny to combat Communism in order for purported good to prevail over alleged evil.

This grand narrative was decommissioned, in effect, with the fall of the Soviet Union toward the end of the 20th Century and was replaced formally to counter Islamic extremism after the 9/11 attacks.

The ‘War on Terror’, as a narrative served a similar purpose in that it inwardly justified the US invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 & Iraq in 2003. It further justified overt and covert military action in Syria, Yemen, Pakistan & Libya in the aftermath of the earlier invasions, in the name of fighting terrorism. Furthermore its continued stance towards Iran was shaped directly by this narrative (Bahgat, 2003). In January 2002, The Bush administration relied on a sub-narrative of states belonging to an ‘Axis of Evil’ that allegedly supported and financed terrorist groups & sponsored terrorism as a whole (Politico, 2019). Crossley shows that this narrative led to a convergence between Christianity scholars and justifications for the Iraq invasion (2014). This Axis narrative initially included Iraq, Iran and North Korea, but grew to include other states over time (Marandi & Pirnajmuddin, 2009). However the linking of the axis & War on Terror narratives implicitly links the axis countries to the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks (Heradstveit & Bonham, 2007). What is curious about this linking is that Saudi Arabia, the country with the highest number of hijackers aboard the planes on 9/11, was not designated as an Axis of Evil state, which signifies the earlier point that policy actions can undermine the existing grand narrative’s integrity. The omission of Saudi Arabia also shows how the inward focus of this grand narrative left it more immune to scrutiny from foreign powers and allowed it to enact its foreign policy based on its own internal insecurities and threat perceptions.

George W. Bush declared the ‘War on Terror’ on the 16th of September 2001, less than a week after the 9/11 attacks. On August 30th 2021, two weeks short of the war declaration’s 20th anniversary, US president Joe Biden declared the end of America’s total military withdrawal from Afghanistan – signaling the end of the ‘War on Terror’ rhetoric espoused by the White House with it. This was clear when Joe Biden referred to ending the ‘forever war’ (The White House, 2021), a synonym for the war on terror (Filkins, 2008), in his remarks to the press on the 31st of August 2021. Biden added “This decision about Afghanistan is not just about Afghanistan.  It’s about ending an era of major military operations to remake other countries” (The White House, 2021). 

While the aforementioned proclamation does not signify an end to counter-terrorism efforts, it marks a shift whereby the US will not find itself invading another state for the sake of fighting terrorism. However, the American withdrawal allowed the Taliban to regain control of Afghanistan’s governance for the first time since 1996, leaving room for this narrative to be potentially revived in the distant future should the need arise. The Afghanistan withdrawal followed on from a significant drawback of US military activities in Iraq, Syria & Libya, where the United States began to lead from behind and allow regional actors to take on a more prominent role in each of the aforementioned conflicts (Marsh, 2014; Dolan, 2017). Since then, other powers have managed to gain a foothold in these regions, namely Russia in Syria and Turkey in Libya. To quantify this drawback, the number of US drone strikes in the Middle East is on the decline. In 2020, Middle East drone strikes stood at 1,459 strikes, compared to 852 strikes in 2021 – this marks a notable decrease of almost 42% (“US Military”, 2021).

Narrative Divergence: Global Audiences

The aforementioned points not only highlight, with good reason, that the ‘War on Terror’ narrative is now practically defunct, they also indicate that the US’ position policing the world is on the decline. This decline has significant ramifications for the changing world order as the United States, overall, does not seem likely to intervene militarily in conflicts that are not terrorism-based either; such as Russia’s recent war with Ukraine in 2022. Emerging powers are beginning to exploit this reality as aforementioned with Russia, and this could possibly lead to a similar scenario with regards to Chinese ambitions in Taiwan and further afield. 

These global trends necessitated a new grand narrative for the United States to counter new perceived threats in the coming decades of the 21st century. For the first time since its fledgling empire days, The United States’ manifest destiny and self-ordained civilizing mission are under serious scrutiny, engendered by political fallout from its military failures in the Middle East. The United States managed to recover its prestige after the fall of the Soviet Union. However, after the military failures in the Middle East coupled with the rise of China, that prestige requires a new narrative to be salvaged and re-directed for better use. Essentially, a new adversary needs to be formally identified, and the threat they pose to American values, ideals and primacy need to be defined.

The United States finds itself in the midst of a changing world order, where China – among other powers – is causing the unipolar order to give way to a multipolar world. In 2011, Hillary Clinton – Secretary of State at the time – emboldened this trajectory by announcing the US’ pivot to Asia (Wang, 2016). This pivot began during a time when the Pentagon had announced defense budget cuts that would amount to over $500 billion by 2020 (Gardner, 2013). These opposing trajectories  – the pivot to Asia and the Pentagon defense spending cuts – would have played a part in the US’ calculation in ending the war in Afghanistan in 2021, as it would have become growingly challenging to meet the demands of the US military in light of the budget cuts in place.

The political will to counter a rising China would see the United States focus a notable chunk of its resources in engaging with states in the Asia Pacific to counter China. The rise of China in the 21st Century poses the prime threat to the US-led world order and posits a real challenge to American primacy overall. Not only are China’s own policies of concern to Washington, its support of the heavily sanctioned Russian economy during the Ukraine crisis proves that US and its allies’ unilateral actions are no longer as effective as in the past.

The United States’ grand narrative of fighting terrorism changed to accommodate its pivot to Asia to counter China. In examining a new American narrative, Breuer & Johnston have noted a consistent and incessant espousal of a Chinese threat to the Rules Based Order (RBO) (2019). They further show – via tracking of online references & hits – that the threat to RBO is almost solely raised against China. Tracing the roots of this RBO narrative leads to the Melbourne Statement issued after a meeting between Australian Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd & US State Secretary Hillary Clinton in 2010, signaling the first record found indicating the official linking of RBO with China (Hagstrom & Gustafsson, 2019). 

The use of RBO signals a marked difference to the narratives used by the United States to combat Communism or Terrorism, as this new narrative implies a threat being faced by the whole world, rather than one geared against US’ existence and ideals. The aforementioned deployment of an RBO narrative would necessitate a move away from the US’ reliance on foundational political myths of manifest destiny and an expressed aim of fighting evil, as the RBO narrative is more secular in nature. This narrative outlines threats to an existing world order and American primacy in lieu of a threat to the US as a nation as seen during the Cold War and War on Terror. Furthermore, this RBO narrative is not primarily geared inward towards the US populace and its policymakers, it is rendered primarily toward foreign capitals around the world due to its alleged global implications. The sustainability of this narrative being geared specifically against China is not assured, as Breuer & Johnston’s same study shows a decrease of the RBO narrative’s linkage to China and an increase to its linkage to Russia since 2015, coinciding with Russia’s annexation of Crimea (2019). 

As aforementioned, the shift toward a multipolar world necessitates narratives to combat all emerging powers seen to be hostile to American primacy, therefore the RBO narrative remains relevant, with or without an increase or decrease of its linkage to one power at the expense of another. In essence, Russia and China are both perceived as candidates for threatening the Rules Based Order due to their expansion into Ukrainian territory and disputed South China Sea waters respectively, both being accused of “breaking the law” (Breuer & Johnston, 2019, p446).

A prime example for further understanding the outward focus of Chinese narratives, is the US citing the term ‘revisionist power’ vis-à-vis China (Taylor, 2007; Huiyun, 2009; Aziz, 2016; Chan, 2021). To the United States, Turner concludes that China “in short, is regarded as guilty until proven innocent” in its alleged intentions of revising the status quo, rules based order (2014, p154). This assertion has demonstrated its accuracy when Hameiri & Jones illustrated that China’s revisionist tendencies were prematurely posited by western scholars vis-à-vis the Chinese Asia International Infrastructure Bank (AIIB) even before the finalization of its mandate in 2015 (2018). While some of the claims of revisionism did indeed hold true after the mandate’s finalization – China has a 26% voting share in the AIIB (Wilson, 2019) – the preponderance to label Chinese-led initiatives as revisionist to the status quo is not unfounded, as by contrast, the World Bank is designed to maintain American veto control over decisions (He & Acharya, 2022). 

Many scholars have further challenged the idea of an existing status quo and have deemed it as a Eurocentric, Western interpretation and narrative of the global order (Acharya & Buzan, 2007; Hurd, 2007; Moshirzadeh, 2009; Terhalle, 2015). The dominant status quo narrative thus is facing an anti-hegemonic challenge that allows room for the emergence of counter-narratives espoused by China. While narratives can and have been used by both parties in a narrative battle as seen with the American ‘Axis of Evil’ versus the Iranian ‘Great Satan’ (See Pyszczynski et al, 2016), the global context of the RBO & revisionist counter-narratives curtail the effect of the originating American narratives being sold to the intended audiences abroad. To further exemplify this point, the allegation of being a revisionist power, has been levelled back at the United States due to the unilateral policies enacted during the Bush & Trump presidencies (Hurd, 2007; Schweller, 2015; Ikenberry, 2017).

China & Counter-Narratives

Upon further examination, China can be seen to be playing the American game of using the fourth face of power by espousing its own narratives that are heavily built upon its unique identity and philosophy to differentiate its rise to global power status (Allison, 2017). China espouses a claim to a peaceful rise, similar to that that has been claimed by the United States during its own rise after World War 2 (Buzan & Cox, 2013). It differs from the United States in that China uses public diplomacy as a primary channel to propagate its narratives, as seen with the proliferation of Confucius Institutes built by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) around the world (Paradise, 2009). The United States, on the other hand, has seen a decline in its use of public diplomacy institutions since the turn of the current century (Brown, 2002; Cull, 2013).

Furthermore, the use of RBO against China does not directly undermine the peaceful claims to China’s rise, as the AIIB example highlighted is a non-military initiative which China claims is building upon the existing RBO and not revising or challenging it (He & Acharya, 2022). Despite Washington’s anti-AIIB stance, key allies all over the world signed on to become founding members of the AIIB, including the United Kingdom (Ashbee, 2021), while the number of overall members has almost doubled from its inception in 2016 up until 2019 (He & Acharya, 2022).

Lastly, American allies are viewing certain anti-Chinese narratives as carrying coercive undertones, seen most recently in the American calls to its allies in banning the use of Huawei’s 5G technology which led to the UK reversing its deal with Huawei (Corcoral, 2021). On the other hand, a majority of  main American allies in the Middle East ignored US calls and have pressed forward with adopting Huawei’s 5G technology, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE and Oman (Wasser et al, 2022). Thus, while the ‘Chinese’ narratives indeed guide US foreign policy, the aforementioned statement regarding the current narratives’ limited efficacy stands. 

Hence, these new Chinese narratives are not sustainable in shaping American foreign policy, particularly vis-à-vis garnering support and credence amongst states around the world, as its implementation lacks institutionalized public diplomacy channels to achieve the desired efficacy. Meanwhile China uses public diplomacy to aid its soft power and, in turn, bolsters its peaceful rise claims (Paradise, 2009). These narratives rely on proponent states of the global order status quo buying-in to these narratives without coercion to ensure their efficacy and long-term viability. With anti-hegemonic narratives increasingly becoming embedded in the self-identity and worldview of emerging powers and non-western institutions around the world, the intended results of the revisionist narratives are unlikely to manifest (Mufti, 2011; Javaid et al, 2016; Neruchek, 2017; Freire, 2018; Sakwa, 2019; Sakwa, 2020). Additionally, the sways and inconsistencies of American foreign policy orientation – especially noted during Trump’s ‘America First’ narrative – has left American allies bereft of confidence in America’s strategic orientation (Mahmood & Cheema, 2018; Kozyrev, 2019). 

As such, the narratives geared toward China will need to be revised to ensure they gain credence globally and that they do not allow room for the narrative to be levelled back against the United States – if they are to succeed. The United States built narratives in the past to differentiate itself from its adversary culturally, politically and ideologically, however this trajectory is absent from the Chinese narratives of today, without which, the U.S. will find itself unable to maintain a rigorous support base at home or abroad. The previous narratives aimed to create a rallying effect at home, while the Chinese narratives today cannot expect such a rallying effect from foreign states due their coercive undertones coupled with American foreign policy inconsistencies in recent years.

Concluding Remarks

To summarize, the current focus of American foreign policy discourse on China has indeed been guided by narratives of Chinese revisionism and threat to the Rules Based Order (RBO). While the earlier Cold War and War on Terror narratives were built and geared toward an American populace & to U.S. policy makers alike, these new ‘Chinese’ narratives aim to market the idea of China posing a global threat to global capitals around the world. Similarly, the old narratives relied on foundational political myths, manifest destiny and American exceptionalism as the backbone of narrative building, meanwhile the Chinese narratives are more secular in nature and are based on the perceived Chinese threat to American global primacy rather than directly to America’s civilizing mission in the world. Furthermore, the older narratives, being inward-focused, were not hampered by counter-narratives espoused by the Soviet Union or ‘Axis of Evil’ states, however the ‘Chinese’ narratives being globally focused face a greater challenge in maintaining their credibility abroad, as the same claims have been levelled back to the United States by states and scholars alike, while some of its allies have not heeded American initiatives vis-à-vis China either. 

Today, in an ever-increasing move to a multi-polar world, the new narratives geared toward China continue to require a global consensus to gain credence and credibility, however this has not had the desired efficacy thus far. China is also an important economic and trade partner for a majority of states, therefore the narratives can expect less support than those espoused morally against terrorist groups or ideologically against the Soviet Union. China’s economic and trade value to world states remains on the rise, and this has led to a lowered adoption to America’s anti-China stance amongst a notable number of its traditional allies (Nathan & Scobell, 2012).

The literature examined stresses the incompatibility of American and Chinese civilizational dynamics as having grave implications to global stability, and this view continues to gain prominence in the current rift between the two powers (Huntington, 2000; Allison, 2017; He & Acharya, 2022). This theoretical lens allows for the use of American values as a differentiating factor between the United States and China, by stressing real or imagined irreconcilable differences between America’s goodness versus an alleged Chinese evil. Narratives are – at their core – primarily propaganda tools to justify specific foreign policy initiatives. This justification cannot be substantiated when the primary audience is global and the claims levelled against China continue to be levelled back at the United States, as shown above. Furthermore, The United States’ decline in the public diplomacy sphere leaves it with little in terms of pushing forth its Chinese narratives to the target audience across the globe.

To conclude, the United States has and continues to rely on narratives to headline its foreign policy priorities. While the earlier narratives of the Cold War and the War on Terror had an inward focus that shielded them from potent scrutiny abroad, the Chinese narratives of today are geared toward a global audience that has necessitated a shift away from deploying myths and ideologies to justify them. It is clear that relying on manifest destiny and other political myths as justification for its China stance will not work on foreign powers, be they allies or otherwise. The current narratives deployed against China – such as the purported threat to RBO and its revisionist posture – are not foolproof as they have been levelled back at the United States by foreign powers and political thinkers alike. This has not aided the United States in aligning its allies’ stance against China as seen with the examples of the AIIB and that of the Huawei ban calls. China continues to pursue a strong public diplomacy strategy that provides cover for its claims to a peaceful rise, while the United States’ public diplomacy institutions have been on a steady decline since the end of the Cold War, leaving its narrative building without a strong, foundational platform to be effective.

Author Statement

This paper has made reference to various sources via in-text citations, the full reference list can be shared upon request. Readers’ feedback and comments are always appreciated and valued.

Leave a comment

Russia’s Black Sea Leaves Ukraine Landlocked

Posted on by Son of the Sultanate

As of October 2022, Ukraine has become virtually landlocked. Engendered by the annexation of 4 Ukrainian territories, the Black Sea is turning into a Russian lake as foretold by experts in the past. Russia’s stated aims in its 2022 war in the Ukraine were the deNazification of the Ukrainian regime and the liberation of the Russian-speaking peoples that reside in eastern Ukraine. However, the application of a geopolitical lens on the conflict reflects a much more bleak reality for the West. The Black Sea, once considered to be an important pillar of European security is crumbling as swiftly as the territorial integrity of the Ukraine.

Ever since the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula from the Ukraine in 2014, the Ukrainian navy has now lost its entire naval presence in the Sea of Azov, which now borders Russia on all sides. Furthermore, its main naval base in Crimea has since been transferred to Odessa since the annexation, leaving it as possibly the only remaining Ukrainian naval port in service. With the war rumbling on, it would come as no surprise to observers should Russia target Odessa next, leaving the Ukraine completely landlocked. The once ‘mature’ naval capabilities of the Ukraine are now limited to one, measly naval base in the Black Sea.

For those familiar with Ukrainian security, it is interesting to note that their defense spending has quadrupled since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, however less than 5% of the entire defense budget was dedicated to bolstering their dwindling naval capabilities. This has allowed Russia to capitalize on this vulnerability in its 2022 military operations, where the naval dimension of the war has been extremely limited. It instead focused on a ground offensive, capturing four Ukrainian territories in the process, three of which are on the Black Sea coast. It is safe to say that Ukraine’s navy has become obsolete in light of recent events.

The importance of the Black Sea to the Ukraine is hardly confined to its sea power projection; it also represents a major avenue of Ukrainian exports. The port city of Mariupol is home to major heavy industries and is amongst the largest Ukrainian export facilities of corn and iron to the Middle East and beyond. Kherson, in particular, was extremely strategic in its control of the water supplies into occupied Crimea. This Ukrainian leverage has now been depleted. The war was able to severely damage the Ukrainian economy on its own, however the loss of two major coastal trading ports may end up harming the Ukraine the most over the medium and long term.

The Black Sea remains one of the most promising basins for energy exploration, with the Ukrainian waters said to have at least 2 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves, the largest known in the basin. It would have meant the Ukraine would have been ranked in the top 15 of countries by proven reserves. It could have single-handedly replaced Russian supplies to Europe at full capacity. This potential has now been curtailed, as Europe struggles to find viable and sustainable alternatives to Russian gas. This, in addition to the sabotage of 2 Nordstream pipelines witnessed late September, further magnifies this struggle.

The annexation of five Ukrainian provinces since 2014 has signalled the emergence of Russia as an evermore significant player in the geopolitics of the Black Sea. The Crimean Peninsula now has a land bridge to mainland Russia, which gives the Kremlin potent leverage in any potential peace talks to end the conflict. For months, western media outlets have been championing the idea that Russia was losing the war, and that Russian tanks were afraid of Ukrainian farm tractors. This arrogance and complacency has translated into the situation on the ground today, with the Ukraine evermore weakened and unable to stave off Russian offensives. These gains will not only boost Russian troop morale, it will likely position Russia to mobilize a new flank emerging from the south, leading to strong, yet premature, prospects of the war continuing long into the winter and beyond. The Ukraine will find it difficult to negotiate from this point of inherent military and structural weakness, leaving Russia to march on to Odessa and leaving Ukraine completely landlocked.

The warnings of experts that the Black Sea was turning into a Russian Lake have materialized, which has weakened NATO’s position in the region. Turkey remains the only major NATO member on the Black Sea, and it does not seem to be willing to directly or indirectly antagonize Russia in this conflict. Should peace talks ever strike a viable and sustainable agreement, it would unlikely involve the removal of sanctions on Russia, as was the case after the post-2014 sanctions. It is for this that my estimation remains bullish that the war will drag on for some time. Moreover, NATO and the Ukraine remain unable to save face given the strategic components lost in this conflict, giving them very little to agree to, which will decrease the likelihood of any peace deal at all.

Since the beginning of the conflict in February, the West has lost strategic naval and export hubs in the Black Sea, a large portion of energy supplies through Nordstream and are witnessing popular and economic upheaval in the face of economic inflation and eye watering energy prices. The western recognition, or lack thereof, of the annexed states’ referendums in September will be of little consequence to the Kremlin, as similarly witnessed in the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Russia is likely to double down and allow the instability in mainland Europe to simmer and fester. Countries have been able to withstand economic sanctions and world isolation in the past, however very few – if any – have been able to survive mass energy blackouts. If the Ukraine turned landlocked in the upcoming months, who would be able to stop it?

An Oil Lifeline for Europe? Ras Markaz

Posted on by Son of the Sultanate

As the war in the Ukraine roars on into its third month, oil prices have maintained record highs. Russia has since become a pariah on the world stage, and the reliability of their energy exports, particularly in Europe, has driven Western powers to urgently explore avenues of energy diversification. It is unlikely that Europe will be able to entirely stave off its reliance on Russian oil, however traditional oil suppliers can relieve the pressure on the subsequent hyperinflated energy markets. The real question at hand is how much is the EU willing to sacrifice in this aim.

OPEC has so far refused to boost production to aid lowering oil prices, marking a shift away from the western narrative that the whole world is united against Russian aggression. The emerging multipolar world is seeing new patterns and alliances form, while the support of the developing world can no longer be guaranteed. For the Europeans, it is worth exploring alternatives.

The Sultanate of Oman, a modest oil producer by OPEC standards, could provide a not so insignificant lifeline. Oman is one of the two custodians of the Strait of Hormuz alongside Iran, through which over 40% of oil tankers pass through on their way out of the Persian Gulf and onto the world. Due to Iran’s constant threats to close off the Strait, insurance and transit fees are exorbitant for net importers of Middle Eastern energy. It is for this that Oman has invested in ports outside the Gulf.

Straddling along Oman’s Arabian Sea coastline lies the Port of Duqm, an artificial settlement built with the sole purpose of linking into the Indian Ocean’s vast supply chains. Duqm has the potential to become a regional – if not global – hub. Other than the port itself, the Omani government, alongside global investors, have poured billions of dollars into constructing a drydock, refineries, fishing terminals and manufacturing zones within the port’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). While not discounting the value of the abundance of manufactured goods available on-site, the port’s strategic value lies purely in its location outside the volatile Persian Gulf, and more importantly, quite a ways away from Iran. A city that could one day boast a population into the tens of thousands aids Duqm’s quest to become a lynchpin of the ever-growing trade network in the Indian Ocean.

Of interest to the energy-hungry European markets is the establishment of the Ras Markaz oil storage facility, a mere 70 kilometres from the port of Duqm. With a current capacity of around 26 million barrels, the facility is expected to boast reserves of around 200 million barrels upon completion. Such storage facilities are not new to the region, the UAE supplies a major oil storage facility in the Indian city of Mangalore that lies in an almost adjacent line to the one in Duqm. However this Mangalorean facility is used primarily to boost India’s oil reserves, while Ras Markaz is purpose-built for export, making it an oil marketplace for the rest of the world. Ras Markaz, at its future capacity of 200 million barrels, could serve as a strategic reserve for the EU, who currently import over 2 million barrels a day from Russia, as it is set to be the largest oil storage facility in the Middle East. Ras Markaz’s intended capacity would dwarf 82 millions barrels stored at the US’ largest oil storage facility in Cushing, Oklahoma. While most oil flows into Europe cannot be supplied majorly from this facility, it would provide relief to the spike in oil prices since February of this year and more so over the long term.

Oman enjoys stable and friendly ties with the EU, a bi-product of Oman’s neutral foreign policy. Oman has secured the release of numerous western hostages in Yemen and Iran over the past decade and has formalised befriending all the nations of the world as a central tenet of its foreign policy. Oman has hosted British air bases on its territory for over a century and continues to welcome port calls from naval vessels from around the world. It also provides access to its military facilities to the American navy and air force, with numerous high-level visits from Pentagon officials to its capital city of Muscat. While neutral in its foreign policy, its consistently warm relations with the West prime Oman to be a stable energy partner for Europe. A testament to this is the UK’s Joint Logistics Support Base built in Duqm in 2018. The base has facilitated some of the largest joint military exercises in the region involving major Western powers, and continues to host Britain’s large aircraft carriers in its waters.

While all the aforementioned factors would bode well for Ras Markaz playing a meaningful role in stabilising oil flows and prices, the Omani government will leverage its reputation in the West for its own national interests. It is worth noting that, at the time of writing, an EU delegation is in Muscat to discuss the long-awaited waivers for Omani visitors to the Schengen area. Many speculate that this visit is in line with the EU’s energy diversification initiatives that will span other states as well. Oman produces just over a million barrels per day, most of which is either consumed domestically or majorly exported to China. Hence, the EU’s current initiative is more likely linked to Oman’s storage – rather than to its production – capacity.


It would seem that Robert Kaplan’s conditional prediction “If Duqm succeeds – still a big “if” – it will become a great place name of the 21st century, just as Aden was in the 19th and Singapore was in the 20th…the Indian Ocean, as I have been writing for years, could become the geopolitical nerve center of postmodern times. Duqm constitutes a multibillion-dollar bet that I am right.” may just materialise in Duqm.

Oman Revives Positive Neutrality

Posted on by Son of the Sultanate

Ever since the signing of the JCPOA in 2015 i.e. The nuclear deal with Iran, Oman’s foreign policy seemed to focus on downplaying its role as an honest broker in the Middle East. This, as Oman’s influence and relevance was on the rise across the region.

Fast forward to 2018, the late Sultan Qaboos began reversing the trend. Other than the the Gulf blockade of Qatar in 2017 when Oman opted to stay mainly on the sidelines. Sultan Qaboos focused Oman’s foreign policy to a conflict close to the hearts of Omanis’, yet further away geographically.

In 2018, Israeli premier Benjamin Netanyahu visited Muscat, followed the next day by Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority. The world watched in anticipation, awaiting Oman to pull the rabbit out of the hat yet again. A concrete plan of action, if not a peace agreement, seemed to be within reach. Yusuf bin Alawi, the former Omani foreign minister, had been meeting with the Israelis for a while by this point. He had infamously remarked in a 2015 BBC Arabic interview that Oman would only offer to facilitate talks between parties if both were serious about reaching a lasting settlement.

Alas, the high-profile visits did not yield any obvious results. It did however send a strong signal that Palestine and Israel were interested in something more productive than the peace processes of the past. The Sultan’s deteriorating health began to limit Oman’s role in this matter. Oman seemed to be going back into isolation.

In January 2020, Sultan Qaboos tragically passed away, after a swift return from medical treatment in Belgium. The family council convened and agreed to open the fabled secret envelope that contained the late Sultan’s pick for successor as Oman’s new sovereign. His first cousin Haitham bin Tariq was thus sworn in. In his first address to the people of Oman and to the world, Sultan Haitham pledged to follow in the footsteps of his predecessor and ensure the continuity of Oman’s policy of befriending all nations of the world.

Sultan Haitham had massive shoes to fill. He focused his first year in power on consolidating his rule and working tirelessly to reinvigorate an Omani economy beleaguered by low oil prices, a rising budgetary deficit and a pandemic that ravaged the entire world. The breakthrough in mRNA vaccines towards the end of 2020 gave the world much needed hope. World governments began refocusing on non-Covid matters. Oman was no exception.

As Oman reopened for business, so did it reopen its doors to diplomacy. February 2021 was a case in point. The Emirati foreign minister Abdullah bin Zayed visited his Omani counterpart Sayyid Badr Al Busaidi in Muscat to discuss bilateral ties and to explore avenues of mutual cooperation. Many reports conclude that this visit had the Yemeni crisis at the top of the agenda. This was followed by the annual naval drill ‘Excercise Sharp Dagger’, in which the navies of France, the UK & the United States all participated. Amongst this flurry of activity, Saudi FM Faisal bin Farhan also visited the Sultanate to discuss regional and international issues. This visit can be seen through the same lens as the visit of the Emirati foreign minister, whereby Yemen would have been at the forefront of talks.

Furthermore, a high profile visit by the commander-in-chief of the US’ Central Command, General Kenneth MacKenzie, to Oman was of particular interest. The visit toured Omani military installations in the strategic Musandam Peninsula, which straddles the critical chokepoint of the Strait of Hormuz. MacKenzie was quick to affirm that Oman was an important partner in maintaining regional security.

These visits and exercises culminated in early March by news that the Americans are meeting with Houthi leaders in Muscat. What is more, at the time of writing, the British defense minister arrived in Muscat for an undefined length of time. This visit seems rather to discuss the latest developments in the attack on an Israeli cargo ship a few days prior, which Israel accused of the Iranians of orchestrating. Either way, the Houthis, being closely tied to Tehran, would no doubt be a crucial talking point as well.

Taking stock of the situation, it would seem Oman is reemerging as an influential player in the Middle East. The intermittent role of passive neutrality has been shelved in favor of a bold and confident agenda. Despite its renowned professionalism, Oman’s military is no behemoth when compared with regional heavyweights Iran and Saudi Arabia. It’s posture has always been defensive, and has not invested in adventurism unlike other neighboring states.

Oman’s weight lies not in its energy reserves or its economic power, rather in its responsible behavior and credibility in regional affairs. It thus should not surprise anyone that regional powers are turning to Oman with a willingness to descalate tensions. Muscat’s role in facilitating the JCPOA; it’s good-intentioned support for the Palestinian cause and its humanitarian efforts in Yemen stand as testiment to this reality.

As the next few months roll out, the Biden administration will seek to replicate Obama’s policy of engagement with Iran. A new JCPOA seems unlikely due to the unilateral withdrawal by President Trump previously. The Iranians would want to ensure that the sways of American democracy do not continue to curtail progress in its return to international society. Tehran will seek stronger assurances and guarantees.

Going by history, it seems Oman remains well-positioned to play its mediating role once again. Sultan Haitham may able to finally enforce his previous commitment to continue in the footsteps of his predecessor, the late Sultan, to forge a lasting agreement in this tense part of the world. This stance of positive neutrality will only serve Oman well and will boost any chance of success in containing and engaging Iran.

The Myth of the Collective Arab World

Posted on by Son of the Sultanate

Identity in the Middle East has become a source of conflict and tension in the region. The spotlight has shifted from that of the Israeli-Palestinian question to that of Kurdish independence in the modern day. Currents of nationalism, secularism and Islamism have been flowing turbulently in the region and are significant drivers of current-day issues affecting the people of the Middle East. However this seems to be ignored in academia; as Arab countries are being lumped into one, homogeneous entity by which policy solutions for one, can also be applied on the other. This “Arab World” that constantly gets referred to is hardly existent; as there seems to be an ever-growing divide fermenting between the states that fall into this category.

The concept of an “Arab World” in academia sees the region as being one as being as easily grouped as the concept of “Europe” in the modern day. What makes this notion even more prevalent is that, unlike in Europe, the “Arab World” share a common language and largely share a common religion; albeit with difference in accents, the development of dialects, and so on. As a result, it may thus beg the question of “why is this generalization problematic?”

To start with, the region labelled the “Arab World” is about twice the size of the “Europe” or “Western Europe” we know today. Furthermore, the current states of the region do not all share a similar history. For example, while Libya is considered to be a modern construct and an “artificial state”, neighboring Egypt is an ancient civilization whose past, present and future are completely separate from that of Libya. The notion of an “Egypt” was never under scrutiny during the 2011 Arab Spring, while the notion of a “Libya” (as most other artificial states in the region such as Iraq & Syria) died with Colonel Gadhafi.

Another pertinent example is Oman. The modern-day Sultanate is the oldest independent Arab state and goes back centuries under the notion of an “Oman”. It successfully built a maritime empire stretching from the coasts of Iran and Pakistan to the coasts of East Africa down to Madagascar. Oman’s identity has not been one that has identified with an Umayyad, Abbasid or Ottoman past. It had an empire in and of its own. The Ottomans managed to control Oman for brief, intermittent periods, but even then it was a very loose kind of control and no remnants of this Ottoman control can be found in Omani cities, towns or even Omani memory. Oman has long been outwardly facing the sea and is linked more to an Indian Ocean identity than to that shared of the Islamic empires of the past centuries and this makes it difficult to view it in the same lens as Egypt or Libya.

Omani-Empire-1856-Map.png

Moreover, you then have the Iraq and the Levant; or what can be considered the battlefield and crossroads of empires over thousands of years. The ancient civilisation of Mesopotamia in Iraq, the Umayyad seat of power in Syria as well as the Abbasid capital in Baghdad give us an entirely different picture of the Middle East. The areas encompassing modern-day Jordan and Syria are those also filled with rich history and is the birthplace of almost all Abrahamic prophets. Thus, Iraq and the Levant’s history is extremely alien, distant and separate from that of Oman or Egypt.

Sexuality-in-the-Arab-World-217x337

History has shaped each of the modern-day states of the Middle East in vastly different ways and has made them share only symbolic similarities in the world of international relations. This is why generalizing the Arab states as being part of a broader, well-understood banner of an “Arab World” does nothing to help one appreciate the complexity of the region nor does it assist one in understanding the varying perspectives, experiences and traditions of the states of Arabia.

It would be absurd, however, to postulate that these states are so far removed from one another that there is nothing that can or does bind them together. These states face similar challenges such as corruption and poor governance, yet this can easily be explained away by non-cultural factors such as its late modernisation and comparatively late state building and establishment of state institutions. Most of Africa and South Asia also have these problems due to similar factors. And as such, this idea of “issues facing the Arab World” is one that is problematic and is impractical. Also, this neither suggests that the cultural practices of the states of Arabia are radically different; it merely points out that there are major differences between these states based on largely external factors such s geography, colonialism, civilizational contacts and power dynamics in the region.

51aEVh8NfuL._SY344_BO1,204,203,200_

Raphael Patai, author of the “Arab Mind”, gives a cultural anthropologist understanding of the Arabs by explaining that tribalism is the key driver of Arab culture. However, it is not reasonable to assume that there is only one “Arab Mind” that transcends the stark differences in climate, geography, societal composition and foreign influences that have shaped separate “Arab” understandings of the world. Surely the preconditions that have shaped the Lebanese psyche are vastly different from those that have shaped that of the Saudi.

The brilliant author Albert Hourani, author of “The History of the Arabs”, produces a masterclass in scholarship yet completely removes the Arabian Peninsula from the accounts of his book. It is almost as if to say that the Arabian Peninsula (from where the Arabs originate) automatically should share the similar history as the rest of Arabia under Umayyad, Abbasid and Ottoman rule. There is no mention for example of the Omani trade empire in the Indian Ocean as also being an important part in the spreading of Arab and Islamic culture through maritime trade. Bernard Lewis’ “History of the Middle East” commits the exact same error. There is a Levant-centrism about the Middle East that has shaped this impractical notion of an “Arab World” that disregards much of the cultural advances of the north-west African Maghreb as well that of the Arabian Peninsula.

pb5977-e1450289100192.jpg

This can also be seen through the events of the so-called Arab Spring. There was extensive literature about how the “Arab World” has awoken and how its people are set to determine their destinies. However, there is also a considerable amount of states in the region who went about unscathed from this apparent wave of democratization that was bound to sweep through the region. Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE, Saudi Arabia to a large extent, Sudan, Morocco and Mauritania did not have any major movement during the Arab Spring and thus to suggest that this single, world of the Arabs was moving and reacting together shows a very selective reading of the region and a desire to push through this collective identity idea. To conclude, there is an air of Orientalism when it comes to the Middle East in academia. There is an insistence on understanding the Arabs as a single, collective unit that one imagines to have similar, shared historical and political experiences that give it similar modern-day challenges. This “Arab World” concept needs to be done without as it does not add anything of significance to the understanding of this culturally and ethnically diverse region of over 300 million inhabitants nor does it do justice to this part of the world.

Iran and Saudi Arabia: Flames in the Midst of Winter

Posted on by Son of the Sultanate

Relations between The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have reached the lowest point since the end of the 1980s. The execution of prominent Saudi Shiite cleric Nimr Al Nimr has sparked outrage in Iran and led to the Saudi embassy in Tehran and the Saudi consulate in Meshad coming under severe attack from Iranian protesters. As a result, the Saudis announced that they would be breaking off their diplomatic ties with their Persian Gulf neighbour effective immediately. The embassies of both countries in the other’s respective territories were to be evacuated within 48 hours and all flights between the two countries were to be halted indefinitely.

This fiasco has severe implications on the entire Middle East; as the two powerhouses in the region are now one step closer to a head-on collision. The relations between the two countries have long contained some degree of tension, yet they have not been this bad for over two decades. Thus, the “cold war” of the 21st century seems close to reaching its climax.

The turning point in the relationship can be viewed after the death of Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah and the ascension of King Salman to the throne in early 2015. Almost immediately after this political shift, Saudi Arabia began trying to expand its influence in the region. Saudi Arabia began displaying its military might by forming an Arab coalition to intervene in the Yemeni state of affairs. Saudi Arabia and its allies began a comprehensive airstrike campaign against the Houthi rebels in key Yemeni cities and had expected a sharp, quick victory. Yet there has yet to appear any sort of positive outcome for the Saudis who are looking like being bogged down in a long, drawn-out and expensive military campaign. Saudi Arabia accuses Iran of arming and supporting the rebels to create “instability and chaos” on the Kingdom’s southern borders. This seems to have been the starting point for the gradual worsening of Saudi-Iranian ties up to the present day.

Also during King Salman’s reign, Iran concluded the nuclear talks by agreeing a comprehensive deal with global powers and there have since been fears in Riyadh of a rapprochement between Tehran and Washington. This, as sanctions are to be gradually suspended from Iran. Iran could thus emerge as a significant player in the export of oil and gas in a post-sanction environment. With the oil prices remaining dizzyingly low, one to two million barrels of Iranian oil on the market could drive the price down further to historic lows. Thus the rivalry between the two powers is contextualised.

Another point of contention between the two countries was the Hajj stampede of 2015. It is estimated that over 1,000 people lost their lives on September the 24th of last year during the Hajj season due to a stampede that occurred at Mina. According to the New York Times, former Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon Ghazanfar Roknabadi went missing in the aftermath of the stampede and Iran has thus accused Saudi Arabia of orchestrating the entire event to abduct key members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard corps. The NY Times goes on to say that – on the other hand – Saudi Arabia accuses Iran of plotting and executing the stampede. This did nothing to improve the ties between the two countries. Whether or not these accusations are true is not the important bit. This war of words is highly indicative of how the two powers view one another.

As shown, the ascension of King Salman to the Saudi throne has tested the limits of the Saudi-Iranian confrontation. King Abdullah had practised greater restraint in dealing with his greatest geopolitical rival. Not even a week into 2016 and the diplomatic relations between the two countries have been broken off and all agreements and treaties have become rendered null and void. Bahrain and Sudan have decided to show signs of support to Saudi Arabia by also breaking off their diplomatic ties with Tehran, while the United Arab Emirates responded by downgrading their ties to Iran. This stand-off between Iran and Saudi Arabia could have lasting impacts on the region, with experts believing that the upcoming peace talks regarding both Syria and Yemen this month may not have the intended outcomes as a result. The fate of the Middle East hinges upon the next moves of both sides.

The Implications of the US Pivot to Asia

Posted on by Son of the Sultanate

“The US’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ has often been viewed as a 21st century Asia-Pacific strategy. However, its main rationale continues long-term US concerns about the power dynamics of Eurasia as a whole.”

The current shift of American attention and resources towards the Asia-Pacific has long been labelled as the US pivot to Asia. The importance of this shift towards the region was echoed in 2011 by the US Secretary of State at the time, Hillary Clinton, when she said: “The Asia-Pacific has become a key driver of global politics” (2011). It worth noting that the region has witnessed an increase in both positive and negative Chinese engagement. Russia sees potential to expand its energy portfolio by increasing exports to the energy-hungry Asian markets. Thus, the region has been attracting interest from a wealth of powers in the 21st century.

The United States’ “Pivot to Asia” or rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific has especially gathered momentum under the Obama administration. The United States has flexed its diplomatic muscle in securing national interests in the Asia-Pacific region through constant and attractive engagement with regional states. Many argue that the United States never left Asia; but is increasing its presence in the region to maintain its superpower status.

In discussing the implications of the US’ pivot to Asia on leading Eurasian states, it is imperative to explore the responses of these Eurasian powers towards the pivot. This paper will look at the determinants of the American urge to pivot to Asia by examining its strategic culture. Furthermore, this paper identifies China and Russia as being the main leading states in Eurasia and their responses to the pivot will be highlighted.

This paper argues that The US pivot to Asia is a dangerous concept as it has already provoked China to increase its defense spending in response to the US’ presence in the region. This competition between the United States and China will start an arms race in Asia and raise the likelihood of war. The significant proposed cuts to US military spending may hinder the success of the pivot and overexpose the United States. Both Russia and China have sought to consolidate their frontiers by establishing regional economic and security groupings such as the Eurasian Economic Union and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as soft balancing mechanisms to counter the United States. Furthermore, this paper argues that the pivot is not as urgent as its current involvement in the Middle East.

The United States: A Realist Lens

Firstly, it is imperative that we understand the mentality that drives the United States’ pivot to Asia. It is critical that the US’ unilateral approach to world affairs is highlighted, not by personal opinion but through academic research and discourse. Former US Senator Henry Lodge raised an important point when he said that United States had a “record of conquest, colonization, and territorial expansion unequalled by any people in the nineteenth century” (Mearsheimer, 2001). John Mearsheimer believes that this same mentality is what drives the United States’ desire for influence and dominance in the Asia Pacific region in the 21st century (2001).

When the United States pivoted to Europe, so to speak, in the middle of the 20th century, it did so to contain the only other regional power of the time; the Soviet Union. Hence, the current pivot to Asia by the US must be viewed through the same lens; as the US looks to contain the rise of China economically and politically. The realist perspective that the United States holds means that it is constantly vying for power and influence. George Bush Senior boldly stated in his defense strategy document that was leaked in 1992 that the United States is the most powerful nation in the world and that it intends to remain in that position by fending off any state that wished to attain superpower status (Wolfowitz, 2009). Furthermore, George Bush Junior’s “National Security Strategy” in 2002 was assertive in its talk of “pre-emptive war” to curtail these same powers (Strategic Comments, 2002; Radek, 2005). The United States believes that creating an extensive and strong global land power network is imperative in its post-Cold War role as the world’s hegemon (Tomlin, 2014).

Pivot to Asia: Past and Present

Here, it is relevant to expand upon the United States’ current status in the pivot and its future plans for the region in the coming years. Military presence in South East Asia and South China Sea has been strengthened by US forces. Furthermore, soft power has also been exercised as foreign aid to Asia-Pacific countries has increased by 7% under the Obama administration (Cropsey, 2014). Moreover, the US aims to have 60% if its naval fleet concentrated in the Asia-Pacific by 2020 in addition to increasing air force units. The US is also working with allies in the Asia Pacific to install and upgrade radar and missile-defense systems (Saunders, 2013).

The US realizes that such a rebalancing can only happen through the use of diplomacy (branded by Hillary Clinton as being “Forward-deployed Diplomacy”) and engaging with South and South East Asian states in security dialogue (Clinton, 2011). Perhaps calling it pre-emptive diplomacy is more appropriate. This newly-founded attention to detail in U.S. diplomacy in general is exhibited in the current US dialogue with Iran; which has seen a deal agreed upon by the negotiating parties. The Obama administration has focused more on US diplomacy than his predecessors who preferred coercive and pre-emptive measures to secure US national interest (Cropsey, 2014).

In addition to its diplomatic efforts with Iran, the United States has also sought to strengthen ties and engage with Central Asian states. Uzbekistan signed various agreements with the United States in the energy and defense sectors worth over $2 billion in 2012 (Markedonov, 2012). Uzbekistan has also been cooperating with the United States over the war in Afghanistan by upgrading transport links to allow NATO easier access to the region in addition to providing electricity to US stations in the country (Markedonov, 2012). The American engagement in Uzbekistan indicates its growing influence in the region. Uzbekistan is adopting a multi-vectored diplomacy that allows it to balance its relationships and dependencies between the US, Russia and China. This suggests serious implications as the US pivot to Asia may also be multi-vectored; to the Asia-Pacific as well in gaining a foothold in Central Asia.

Transpacific Partnership: Isolating China?

The Transpacific Partnership, or TPP, is expected to become the most important trade bloc of the Asia Pacific region (Panda, 2014). Initiated and led by the United States, it currently includes states from South East Asia, North America, Australia and South America. Negotiations have been ongoing for the past decade to put the partnership into action.

There is a slight problem with the TPP; it does not include China as of yet. Chinese officials have seen it as being an anti-Chinese project and a way to isolate China. The US and other partners in the TPP have hinted that any Asia-Pacific state that wishes to join the partnership must economically and politically conform to “high standards”, despite current Chinese president Xi Jinping focusing most of his tenure on economic reform (Panda, 2014). The TPP would eventually abolish trade restrictions for member states to facilitate trade in the Asia-Pacific rim. This would then mean that states in the region will become much less dependent upon imports from China, thus curtailing Chinese economic power and growth (Xin, 2014).

US officials have asserted that the exclusion of China is not part of a broader containment strategy and that China may be invited to join after the negotiations are concluded. In simpler terms, the US is issuing China an ultimatum; to either join their elite trade grouping under terms they had no say in or be excluded entirely (Xiaotong, 2015). This spread of US influence in the region thus becomes clear; as it makes no sense for the US to exclude its largest trading partner from a regional trade bloc (Devadason, 2014). Hence it would seem that isolating China from such an important economic partnership is essentially banging the drums of war, economic war for now (Xin, 2014).

The SCO: China’s Charm Offensive

China now has the largest army in the world. Xi Jinping’s administration is keen to ensure that the United States’ pivot to Asia does not harm Chinese interests. As a result, China is willing to engage and win what they call “small, sharp wars” in the region as a show of force (Gardner, 2013). In Chinese terms, they are willing to “kill a chicken to scare the monkeys” (Zhang, 2002). Such rhetoric maintains China’s assertion to protect its sovereignty or its traditional suzerainty. China’s security is of great importance due to the fact that it borders 14 states; with 4 of them being nuclear states. Xinjiang and Hong Kong already contain the seeds of separatism and China is also weary of the spread of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism on its western frontiers. Also worth mentioning is China’s territorial disputes with regional powerhouse India and traditional foe Japan as well as its maritime disputes with the Philippines in the South China Sea.

Therefore the need to ramp up regional security is of great importance to China. The SCO is the most important response to China’s security needs (Feng et al, 2008). Alongside Russia, the two states dominate the organisation alongside four other Central Asian states. It is key to note that China and Russia have held joint military exercises in the Ural Mountains under the banner of the SCO without participation of the other member states (Bin, 2012). This is perhaps part of the ‘killing chickens’ strategy mentioned earlier to assert the capabilities of the Eurasian giants in response to any potential NATO aggression.

Apart from the hard power and power exhibition, China has more to gain from the SCO. China has been engaging diplomatically with the SCO’s member states as well with potential members of the organisation (Feng et al, 2008). Examples of this have been seen through the increased Chinese investment in Central Asian infrastructure. In addition, China has provided thousands of scholarships to member states for citizens to study at Chinese universities. Therefore, soft power is an important mechanism for the Chinese as they seek to expand the SCO to someday rival the power and expansionism of NATO (Qinhua, 2008).

It must be stressed that for China to maximise on its regional projects, it must engage with other emerging Asian powers such as Indonesia and India. The success of the SCO and maritime Silk Road depend heavily upon Indian cooperation (Song, 2013). Thus, China must prove its good intentions to India as well as acknowledging India as being an integral part of the project by acknowledging its maritime heritage and importance. In other words, China must prove that they believe that the 21st century is the Asian Century and not the Chinese Century.

China also sees the SCO as being a key driver of its Silk Road project with the SCO being the most appropriate organisation to institutionalise its regional economic plans (Song, 2013). It also provides China with negotiating leverage with India to cooperate in the Silk Road initiative as the Indians have shown a keen interest in joining the SCO as a full member instead of their current observer status (Bin, 2012). Thus China’s efforts in trust building with regional powers is essential in its regional projects.

The SCO, despite being a security grouping is not an attempt to militarily challenge the United States, rather it is China’s soft balancing strategy to indirectly challenge the balance of power and to contain US influence in the traditional spheres of Chinese influence (Song, 2013). Soft balancing relies upon using diplomatic and economic methods to frustrate and weaken the dominant power. In addition to the SCO, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) founded by China may also prove to be a key soft balancing tool for the Chinese in future (Song, 2013). China acknowledges that it cannot directly compete with the United States militarily, and even if it could, it would prove far too costly (Kaplan, 2005). The United States also realises that hard power against China would be extremely expensive and have also engaged in the soft balancing act; with the aforementioned example of the Transpacific Partnership (TPP).

Soft balancing is not something that China or Russia came up with. It has long been happening in regards to European security; as early as 1991. The increased economic integration of the European Union has been a response to US influence that has allowed Europe to push for more autonomy in security matters (Pape, 2005). This soft balancing between “friends and allies” means that the traditional West is re-emerging as two separate yet friendly blocs and catalyses the process of ‘multi-polarisation’ of the world’s power structure (Oswald, 2006). Soft balancing is essentially being deployed all across the Eurasian sphere, with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan adopting a multi-vectored diplomacy to balance Russian dominance through engaging with the United States, China, Japan and India (Markedonov, 2012). The prevalence of soft balancing in the modern day conduct of international relations further stresses the importance that China places on this strategy and on the SCO as the main force of implementation (Song, 2013). It is important that China carefully approaches its Central Asian initiatives in order to avoid making it seem as it if is looking to replace Russia as the most influential in the region (Qinhua, 2008). China must try and balance its Silk Road project with the Eurasian Economic Union to avoid confrontations with Russia.

The Chinese notion of “all under heaven”; where all past tributary states formerly under China’s tribute system are back under China’s influence is key to Chinese strategic thinking (Liu, 2010). China sees no issue in binding these states as part of Greater China as it has already gone from identifying as a “five race republic” to a state of common identity that comprises of Han and non-Han Chinese (Zhang, 2002). This is perhaps the main drive of soft balancing against the United States; to reclaim its former Middle Kingdom status, especially in regards to reclaiming Taiwan under Chinese Suzerainty. It does not seek to replace or challenge the United States as the world’s only superpower (Liu, 2014).

Russia, Regionalism & Retaliation

Russian’s prime national interest is the maintenance of its traditional, Soviet spheres of influence and ensuring that its “allies” do not lean towards the West in the form of either NATO or the EU. Russia’s military intervention in neighbouring Georgia in 2008 and its current ongoing conflict with the Ukraine are examples of this. However, despite the opposition towards Russia’s involvement in the Ukraine by Western powers, the actions of Russia are not abnormal in the world of power politics. They are the direct result of Western expansionism into the traditional spheres of Russian influence through EU and NATO membership (Mearsheimer, 2014). Ukraine, however, was the last straw. The Ukraine is vital to Russian economic interests as many of Russia’s oil and gas pipelines to Europe pass through the Ukraine (Rywkin, 2014). A more politically independent and Western-leaning Ukraine would not allow Russia to fully control the flow of energy exports to Europe.

Another factor for Russian concern in the Ukraine is the prospect a NATO military base on Russia’s borders; with special concern over a potential base in the Crimea (Mearsheimer, 2014). It is imperative that the importance of the Ukraine to Russia’s strategic interests is not underscored. Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was once a national security advisor to president Jimmy Carter and is now a top foreign policy advisor to the Obama administration talked about the importance of the Ukraine in the geopolitics of Eurasia in his book “The Grand Chessboard” said “without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire” (1997). Furthermore, according to John Mearsheimer, Russia is acting in the same way the United States would if China built a military alliance with Canada and Mexico (2014). What great power would tolerate a foreign entity meddling in its sphere of influence?

Other than defensive military action on its frontiers, Russia has looked for alliance building to the southwest of its borders; namely with Central Asia. The Customs Union and now the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), stand as testimony to this Russian influence in the region and shows Russian desire to further unite and assimilate its Eurasian neighbours into a closely-knit bloc; separate to the European Union (Galeotti, 2015).

Russia is dissatisfied that the victors of the Cold War and the principles of the victors such as democracy and economic interdependence should form the basis of strong state sustainability (Liik, 2014). In any relationship Russia may have with China it is always bound to be its junior partner. Thus, the EEU is a way of soft balancing Chinese interest in Eurasia. The Russians, more than the Chinese, seek to truly globalise the world order. This can be seen through its founding membership status in the SCO, BRICS and the EEU stand as testimony to this. It is worth noting that none of the aforementioned groupings include Western states. It is also worth noting that Russia’s Eurasian projects are all part of a long-term plan of revitalising its desolate Far East to avoid overarching Chinese influence in the region (Liik, 2014). Russia’s Eurasian plans are seen to be a result of disillusionment and dissatisfaction with the West rather than any sort of great incentive in the East. Russia sees itself as the last standing bastion of true, European values and the moral decline of the West is the main reason for its disillusionment (Youngs, 2010). This is perhaps the key to understanding the mutual mistrust between Russia and the United States. The Western agenda in the Ukraine is the latest and most serious manifestation of this.

Future Implications of the Pivot

The Eurasian sphere has been active in diplomatic, economic and defense projects to protect its own interests as the divide between east and west grows further apart. Thus, a sense of regionalism or Eurasianism binds the states of the region into a more unified bloc. It is mainly a regionalism of necessity, however, it should be at the forefront of US and Western strategic thinking. The more the United States flexes its military might in Eurasian frontiers, the further assimilated the Eurasian states become. This collective Eurasian soft balancing is draining US resources as the pivot to Asia is becoming increasingly challenging for the Obama administration.

The US rebalance to Asia has become a dangerous concept. The United States will need to rethink its plan of deploying 60% of its naval fleet in the Asia Pacific, especially in light of the Pentagon’s budget cuts of $500 billion over the next ten years (Gardner, 2013). The United States faces the prospect of spreading itself too thin should the budget cuts go ahead and conflict escalate in the Middle East (Gardner, 2013). It would be extremely challenging for the US to maintain a strong military presence in both the Middle East and the Asia Pacific; especially in light of the aforementioned budget cuts.

However, should the United States successfully execute their rebalancing project, it may establish and escalate conflict in many parts of the world. The US has already provoked China into increasing military spending and improving its blue water power. This, in turn, has alarmed the Japanese as Prime Minister Shinzo Abe who has increased Japan’s defense spending to $3.5 billion dollars to improve air defense mechanisms and its naval strength (Oros et al, 2010). The Japanese have already promised to forge a “security diamond” that would include India, the United States and Australia in a bid to contain and counter China (Bush, 2010). Even though this might not necessarily mean war, the insecurity that brews as a result of possible war would be detrimental to both states’ economies.

Moreover, some scholars have claimed that the US is overestimating China. They argue that the Chinese are not looking to replace the US as the world’s only superpower; rather, they are looking to counter it. Part of this overestimation, is the timing of the US’ pivot to Asia. Amitai Etzioni, a prominent US scholar and sociologist argues that this pivot is premature as China is a long way off challenging US dominance (2013). He argues that it is also premature to move away from the Middle East as there is no urgent need to pivot to Asia. Additionally, Robert Kaplan, in his 2005 publication “How We Would Fight China”, concludes that “China has committed itself to significant military spending, but its navy and air force will not be able to match ours for some decades.” Therefore, the pivot to Asia would only catalyse an arms race between rising Asian states to counter either US or Chinese aggression. Etzioni also argues that by the time China catches up to the United States, the nature and weapons of warfare could have changed dramatically; thus overcommitting weaponry and other military technology might have been for nothing. For example, two decades ago drone technology and cyber warfare were unheard of (Kaplan, 2005). Today, both are considered critical in maintaining national security. Thus, the United States may need to recalculate and reconsider the pivot to Asia. A premature pivot may only raise tensions, heighten mistrust and endanger future American interests in the Asia Pacific rim.

REFERENCE LIST

Bin, Y. (2012). China-Russia Relations: Succession, SCO, and Summit Politics in Beijing. Comparative Connections, 14(2), 131.

Brzezinski, Z. (1997). The Grand Chessboard. Harvard International Review, 20(1), 48.

Bush, R. C. (2010). The Perils of Proximity: China-Japan Security Relations. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press.

Clinton, H. (2011). America’s Pacific Century. Foreign Policy, (189), 56.

Cropsey, S. (2014). The Rebalance to Asia: What Are Its Security Aims and What Is Required of U.S. Policy? Briefing Paper. Hudson Institute.

Devadason, E. S. (2014). The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): The Chinese Perspective. Journal of Contemporary China, 23(87), 462-479. 

Etzioni, A. (2012). The United States’ Premature Pivot to Asia. Society, 49(5), 395-399.

Feng, H., & He, K. (2008). If not Soft Balancing, then what? Reconsidering Soft Balancing and U.S. Policy toward China. Security Studies, 17(2), 363-395. 

Galeotti, M., & Bowen, A. S. (2014). Putin’s empire of the mind. Foreign Policy, (206), 16-19.

Gardner, H. (2013). NATO Expansion and US Strategy in Asia: Surmounting the Global Crisis. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kaplan, R. D. (2005). How We Would Fight China. Boston: Atlantic Media, Inc.

Liu, T. (2014). Chinese Strategic Culture and the use of Force: Moral and Political Perspectives. Journal of Contemporary China, 23(87), 556-574. 

Liu, X. (2010). Recast all Under Heaven: Revolution, War, Diplomacy, and Frontier China in the 20th century. New York: Continuum.

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton.

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014). Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions that Provoked Putin. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.

Oros, A. L., Tatsumi, Y. (2010). Global Security Watch- Japan. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO.

Oswald, F. (2006). Soft Balancing Between Friends: Transforming Transatlantic Relations. Debate: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, 14(2), 145-160. 

Panda, J. P. (2014). Factoring the RCEP and the TPP: China, India and the Politics of Regional Integration. Strategic Analysis, 38(1), 49-67.

Pape, R. A. (2005). Soft balancing against the United States. International Security, 30(1), 7-45. 

Qinhua, X. (2008). SCO and Russia-China-India Triangular Relations. Himalayan and Central Asian Studies, 12(2), 21.

Radek, K. (2005). US National Security Strategy. Mezinárodní Vztahy, 40(1), 71.

Rywkin, M. (2014). Ukraine: Between Russia and the West. American Foreign Policy Interests, 36(2), 119-126. 

Saunders, P. C. (2013). The rebalance to Asia: U.S.-China Relations and Regional Security. Strategic Forum, (281), 1-16.

Sergey Markedonov (2012). Uzbekistan: The End of a Multi-vector Foreign Policy? Centre for Strategic & International Studies. Retrieved from http://csis.org/publication/uzbekistan-end-multi-vector-foreign-policy

Song, W. (2013). Feeling Safe, Being Strong: China’s Strategy of Soft Balancing through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. International Politics, 50(5), 664. 

The Bush National Security Strategy: What does ‘Pre-Emption’ Mean? (2002). Strategic Comments, 8(8), 1-2. 

Tomlin, J. K. (2014). On “Rebalancing US Military Power”. Parameters, 44(1), 118.

Wolfowitz, P. (2009). Realism. Foreign Policy, (174), 66-72.

Xiaotong, Z. (2015). China’s Views of the TPP: Take it or Leave it; that is the Question. The International Spectator, 50(1), 111-116. 

Xin, L. (2014). A General Equilibrium Analysis of the TPP free trade Agreement with and without China. Margin: The Journal of Applied Economic Research, 8(2), 115-136.

Youngs, R. (2010). Europe’s Decline and Fall: The Struggle against Global Irrelevance. London: Profile Books.

Zhang, T. (2002). Chinese Strategic Culture: Traditional and Present Features. Comparative Strategy, 21(2), 73-90. 

Hunting for Huntington’s Clash of Civilisations

Posted on by Son of the Sultanate

Huntington claims that the clash of civilisations that is occurring between the West and other civilizations – mainly that of Islam and Confucianism – will be magnified by cultural reasons above all else. However if one were to try and generalise 1 billion people as belonging to the same Islamic or Confucian “culture”, there then occurs a wide, unfair and arrogant overgeneralisation.

Furthermore, this idea that somehow the Islamic world clashes with the West based upon the short memory of Huntington that is based upon the crusades of the 11th  to 13th centuries, does not paint the full picture of the Islamic-Western relations and their shared history. Because culture can sometimes be seen as an abstract idea of civilizational dynamics, it is relevant to try and provide a concise understanding of it.

What seems to be very absurd on Huntington’s part is that non-western countries should be forced to conform to western ideas, notions and values so that they can further integrate into the western-style institutions of global governance. By then claiming that Islamic civilization is at odds with that of the West, Huntington forgets that almost all Muslim-Majority countries are allies or on friendly terms with the United States and its other western partners. Iran may be the only exception to this and thus Huntington’s views regarding this supposed clash distorts reality.

 Perhaps Huntington’s thesis should have mentioned that the cultural dimension of conflict after the cold war would be driven by governments that adopt these so-called anti-western cultures. In other words politicized culture could instead be the main driver of this clash not culture in and of itself. As such, the main examples of this supposed clash should not be an Islamic country, nor should it be the Confucian civilisation, rather, Huntington should have asserted that it is the apparent divide that exists between the West and Russia that fuels it. Russia is far more interconnected with the West than any other civilisation over millennia, yet there exists visible and stark differences between the two. The initial divide can be seen through the religious lens: Russia sees itself as having inherited the capital of Christian orthodoxy from the Eastern Roman Empire, while the West has adopted the Catholic remnants of the Western Roman Empire. The Cold war that followed centuries later was to be about political ideology: Democracy in the West vs Communism in the Soviet Union. Despite the Cold War having officially ended, it is still alive in the geopolitics of the modern day. From the NATO expansionism into zones of traditional Russian influence to its encirclement of Russia, this assessment is not unfounded.

Thus, Russia and the West seem to be pushing the clash of civilisations, not Islam or China. Huntington’s imperialist view that the uncivilised and backward “Rest” is somehow jealous and angry with the modern day advances of the “West” is a further distortion from the truth. Surely then, the probability of China overtaking the United States as the largest economy in the world would render Huntington’s thesis obsolete. The “rest of the world” had lived comparably harmoniously with one another throughout the Indian Ocean through trade, commerce and the embracing of civilisations. It would seem that Western civilisation, above all others, is the one keen on promoting and vying for some sort of civilisational clash. This is not to say that the non-western world were living a Utopian existence before the intervention and colonialism of the West, however it has managed to co-exist far better than the West has with any other civilisation As a result of this conclusion, a more befitting title for Huntington’s publication should have been “The Clash of the West vs the Rest” in keeping with his imperialistic tendencies.

Yusuf Bin Alawi – BBC Arabic Interview

Posted on by Son of the Sultanate

His Excellency Yusuf bin Alawi, the Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs conducted an interview 3  weeks ago with BBC Arabic’s Giselle Khoury to discuss regional developments as well as Oman’s role in the international relations of the Middle East.

Khoury began by mentioning Oman’s foreign policy in recent years. Oman was vocal about its rejection of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) turning into a union of gulf states. Oman also did not recall its ambassador to Qatar when Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE did so in 2014. Oman was also the only GCC country, and one of a handful of Arab states, to not break diplomatic relations with Syria after the outbreak of the civil war in 2011.

Iran Nuclear Deal

Bin Alawi asserted that His Majesty Sultan Qaboos bin Said understood that the nuclear issue with Iran could easily engulf the entire region in flames and therefore Oman should use its strong relations with both Iran and the United States to bring the two sides closer. When asked by Khoury if Oman’s Ibadhi sect had any role in the strengthening of Omani-Iranian relations, bin Alawi refuted this claim and said that Ibadhism was spread throughout Oman and parts of North Africa, and did not have any relevance to foreign policy.

Bin Alawi believes that the United States viewed Iran with suspicion after the Islamic Revolution in 1979. He added that the belief was common for the past few decades that the United States was not serious in negotiating with Iran, they were merely testing the waters. During the past decade, with Ahmedinejad’s reign as Iranian president and the election of the republican Bush administration, any sort of negotiations between the two sides were out of the question according to Bin Alawi.

Bin Alawi remarked that the Bush administration virtually “closed all doors to Iran” and did not want to use diplomacy to solve the stand-off and limit the Iranian nuclear program. The United States at the time preferred the use of hard power such as military build-up in the Persian Gulf and the imposing of economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation on Iran. The belief was that Iran would surrender and abandon their nuclear program through this coercion. Bin Alawi added that the Bush administration’s logic “was illogical and not reasonable” as they did not want Iran to attain any sort of nuclear expertise, nor any other type of notable expertise.

“The United States knows that it is a superpower; it can act in which ever fashion it likes knowing that it will not be held accountable for its actions”, Bin Alawi noted. Alas, came the Obama administration and things changed. Oman found that Barack Obama was willing to engage Iran and find a peaceful, diplomatic solution. As this was the case, His Majesty Sultan Qaboos believed that Oman should catalyse the process as this was an opportunity not to be missed. Oman began by mediating hostage exchanges between the two sides. “His Majesty’s strong relations with Iranian leaders thus paved the way for nuclear talks”, said bin Alawi. Bin Alawi also believes that the Iranians by nature do not enter into anything without there being considerable probability that it would succeed. Thus, both sides had confidence in a comprehensive agreement.

Bin Alawi acknowledged that nuclear talks would be an uphill challenge; as the idea of dismantling or limiting Iran’s multi-billion dollar nuclear program would not be taken lightly by the Iranians. Furthermore, Bin Alawi believed that the Iranian people viewed their nuclear program as being a “source of national pride” thus compounding upon the already tricky situation.

Yemen

Bin Alawi believed that Oman’s diplomatic efforts as well as the challenging situation of the Arab Coalition’s military campaign facilitated the agreement between al the relevant parties in the conflict.

Syria

The only Arab country that Syria’s foreign minister Waleed Al Moallem visited since the Syrian crisis broke out was the Sultanate of Oman. Bin Alawi asserted that the Arab League’s decision to break diplomatic ties with Syria as being a “wrong decision”. The upkeep of these diplomatic relations allowed for the talks between Oman and Syria’s foreign ministers. Bin Alawi was also the first Arab foreign minister to meet with Syrian President Bashar Al Assad since the outbreak of conflict in 2011. Khalid Khouja, the leader of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, also met with bin Alawi recently. Bin Alawi commented that Khalid Khouja was encouraged to meet with Omani officials by Qatari foreign minister Khalid Al Attiyah. After meeting all the local sides in the Syrian conflict , Bin Alawi felt that all sides were willing to find some sort of solution to the crisis.

When the interviewer quizzed bin Alawi as to whether Oman would be willing to facilitate the negotiations, bin Alawi assertively stated that Oman would be ready to do so only if they felt that all sides were 100% committed to finding a solution and that they were confident of an agreement. Bin Alawi commented that Oman did not want the negotiations to be a “show for the media and for everyone to come and say whatever they wanted”, rather that there be a concerted effort to solve the conflict.

Omani Sea Power: Beyond a Neutral Foreign Policy

Posted on by Son of the Sultanate

Ever since Sultan Qaboos’ ascension to the throne, Oman has become synonymous with a pragmatic and “friends of everyone” foreign policy. Oman has built up friendly relations with virtually every country in the world including the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) and Iran. This foreign policy stems from Oman’s sensitive geopolitical location as it controls one half of the Strait of Hormuz and is neighbours with both Iran and Saudi Arabia; who are enjoying a long period of tension and mistrust. As Oman is inferior militarily to both countries, remaining neutral seems to be the safest bet; as it would not wish to become a future battleground of a proxy war between the two (as is happening in Yemen). Therefore, because of its neutrality, Oman has been able to benefit from diplomatic, economic and trade relations with both countries. It also allows them to hedge between the two as neither country would want Oman to lean towards the other. Thus, Oman can be seen as a balancer in the Persian Gulf.

Oman’s geographical location is also very unique; it is the only country to lie on both the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Is important to note that this has had an important impact upon Omani identity both politically as well as socially and culturally. Over 95% of Oman’s coastline lies on the Indian Ocean and over 65% of its citizens live within 35km of the coast; thus Oman’s maritime security is imperative for the country’s overall stability. What is more, desalination plants (the lifeline of Oman), sea ports and the tourism industry become vulnerable to attack without proper maritime defences and would have adverse consequences on the economy should an attack take place. Being such a sea-oriented state, Oman needs to also effectively protect its sovereign waters, its fisheries industry, its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Oman is also required to have search and rescue capabilities as well as the capacity to conduct deterrence operations.

In addition, the Indian Ocean Rim is likely to become very congested in the near future as the US pivots away from the Middle East and into Asia. India and China are also vying for influence in this maritime space to shore up relations and protect their trade. China continues to fret over the possibility of the closure of the Malacca Straits by the United States and has thus began spreading its wings in the South China Sea. It will gradually make its way into the Indian Ocean for further power projection. Therefore, it is important for Oman to adjust its capabilities to deal with the future threats and challenges that a congested Indian Ocean would bring. Further to this, the regional powers that will make up the traffic of the Indian Ocean are all investing heavily in modernising their own naval forces. China, India and the United States are all engaging in major shipbuilding and are thus self-sufficient to a degree. Oman on the other hand does not harbour any sort of shipbuilding infrastructure in place. Oman Drydock Company has expressed interest in exploring the shipbuilding sector, but is so far only dealing with vessel repairs and conversion. Even if it were to begin building ships, it is unlikely that it would include warships as it would require significant capital for R&D (research and development) and would also need a skilled work base. Therefore, Oman will most likely have to improve its navy through arms procurement and imports. It must be noted that Oman’s two immediate sea neighbours, Iran and the UAE, each construct a significant amount of warships.

Abu Dhabi Shipbuilding is the first and only company amongst Gulf states that builds warships. It has the capacity to construct “highly complex naval ships including the integration of weapon combat systems”. The company can construct corvettes, fast patrol boats, interceptors, missile boats, fast troop carriers and much more. Abu Dhabi shipbuilding has already commenced the construction of 5 corvettes for the UAE navy and is attracting interest from both Kuwaiti and Saudi naval forces. Oman on the other has no such capacity. In the long term, it may prove to be beneficial to invest in such infrastructure. What is surprising, is that despite its much smaller coastal area, the UAE has 11 corvettes in service while Oman only has 5. Oman must be able to at least keep up with regional navies to maintain its own security and deter any possible aggression or coercion.

Khareef- Class Corvettes

Khareef Corvette.jpg

Oman has acquired three new Corvette class vessels for its navy constructed by BAE Systems in Portsmouth, UK in 2014. Corvettes are considered to be the smallest class of naval vessels that can be called “warships”. Frigates, destroyers and aircraft carriers are all bigger and more effective. However, in recent years, corvettes are witnessing increasing demand in the world market due to their small size and comparably lesser costs. The Khareef corvettes enhance Oman’s capabilities in protecting its maritime areas of interest including its Exclusive Economic Zone and continental shelf. It also allows for extended surveillance patrols due to its endurance of up to 21 days at sea per deployment. The corvettes are also extremely well adept at conducting search and rescue as well as maritime disaster relief operations. They also give Oman important deterrence capabilities.

The Khareef class corvettes can travel at speeds of around 28 knots (25 km/h; 32 mph), which does not make it amongst the fastest; however it is still a reasonable speed for a corvette. The range it covers is roughly 4,500 nautical miles (8,300km; 5,200 miles) which is more than adequate to patrol all of Oman’s coastal waters and EEZ. The corvettes are armed with:

  1. 1 x 76mm Oto Melara Cannon (Italy)

  2. 2 x 30mm MSI D530M Cannons (United Kingdom)

  3. 8 x MM-40 Block 3 Exocet SSM Anti-ship missiles (France)

  4. 12 x MBDA VL Mica SAM Anti-air short to medium range missiles (France)

  5. 6 x Machine gun mountings

These specifications seem to be sufficient for a small fleet of corvettes however the Exocet anti-ship missiles installed may not prove adequate. These missiles can only cover a distance of 180km and thus does not cover Oman’s entire EEZ (200 nautical miles/ 370km). These missiles are not considered to be one of the fastest either at 1,134km and weighs in at around 165kg.

A better option for the anti ship missiles would have been the Brahmos anti-ship missiles produced jointly by Russia and India. India already makes use of it in its navy while Russia is considering it for its newer warships. Brahmos missiles are the fastest low-altitude missiles in the world. They can travel at up to 3,675 km/h; thus giving any potential aggressor much less time to react. These missiles have a range of up to 290km; giving off a much better capability than the Exocet missiles. The Brahmos missiles are also 35kg heavier than the Exocet missiles and thus would cause more damage. They are also accurate to 1 metre. These missiles are also extremely flexible as they can be launched from ships, land-based missile batteries as well as certain aircraft. They can only be detected from 27km which gives less chance of a pre-emptive strike from the opponent. These missiles would give Oman a much enhanced capability in protecting its sovereign waters and EEZ and thus would prove to be a much better fit for the Omani navy.

Oman has substantive maritime resources including fisheries, offshore oil and gas as well as minerals. With heightened competition over resources in the future, Oman must be able to tackle these challenges head on. Oman’s EEZ is almost bigger than the country’s land mass and therefore deserves a considerable amount of attention, investment, planning and protection. The Strait of Hormuz, where 40% of the world’s oil supply passes through, will also need Oman to be able to effectively challenge any threat to it remaining open. It requires a strong and extensive navy to be able to do so. If Oman cannot guarantee the security of its sea lanes, it will not always be able to ensure the safe passage of its imports or its exports; and thus the whole economy would be at risk. Oman was once one of the greatest navies in the Indian Ocean; it allowed it to form its extensive trade empire from Gwadar and Hormuz in the north and the Swahili Coast of East Africa in the south. If Oman wishes to regain its status on the high seas, it will need to develop its naval and maritime capabilities by investing in frigates, destroyers and other naval equipment.